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Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi: The Louisiana
State Law Institute's Advisory Opinion Relative to
Non-Navigable Waterbottoms
Lawrence E. Donohoe, Jr.
Patrick G. Tracy, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION

The Louisiana Legislature in 1991 directed the Louisiana State Law
Institute to study the law of Louisiana with respect to the ownership
of non-navigable waterbottoms in light of the United States Supreme
Court opinion in the Phillips case. To carry out its mandate the Law
Institute established a special committee comprised of representatives
from the Mineral Board, the State Land Office, the Attorney General's
Office, the Governor's Office, the State's Cabinet, Environmental and
Coastal Zone Protection groups, the Louisiana Landowners Association,

members of the Bar from throughout the state, and law professors who
regularly teach property law.'
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After several meetings during 1991 the committee brought its report
to the Council of the Law Institute on December 13, 1991 for full
discussion. At its January 17, 1992 meeting, the Council heard reports
by the Louisiana Landowners Association and by a special sub-committee
giving voice to opinions different from the committee report itself. At
the conclusion of the discussion on January 17, 1992, the Council voted
unanimously to adopt the advisory legal opinion prepared by the committee.
The legislature by Act 998 of the 1992 regular session recognized
that the effect of the Phillips decision on ownership of "Phillips Lands"
in Louisiana is consistent with the opinion and conclusion expressed in
the Louisiana State Law Institute Advisory Legal Opinion Relative to
Non-Navigable Waterbottoms as transmitted to the legislature on or
about January 31, 1992.2 This is the repository for the advisory legal
opinion referred to in Act 998.1
January 31, 1992
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE
ADVISORY LEGAL OPINION RELATIVE TO NON-NAVIoABLE
WATERBOTTOMS

House Concurrent Resolution No. 145 of the 1991 Regular Session
of the Louisiana Legislature directed the Louisiana State Law Institute
to study the law of Louisiana with respect to the ownership of inland
non-navigable waterbodies in light of the recent United States Supreme
Court decision Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 108 S.
Ct. 791, 98 L. Ed. 2d 877 (1988), and legislation introduced in the 1991
Regular Session designed to clarify Louisiana law in this area.
Specifically, the Louisiana State Law Institute was requested to study
and report on the law of Louisiana with respect to the following two
questions:
1) What was the law of Louisiana prior to the decision in
Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, regarding ownership of non-

2. "B. Consistent with the Louisiana State Law Institute Advisory Legal Opinion
Relative to Non-Navigable Waterbottoms to the Louisiana Legislature on or about January
31, 1992, the legislature hereby finds that as to lands not covered by navigable waters
including the sea and its shore, which are subject to being covered, by water from the
influence of the tide and which have been alienated under laws existing at the time'of
such alienation, the Phillips decision neither reinvests the state, or a political subdivision
thereof, with any ownership of such lands nor does the state, or a political subdivision
thereof, acquire any new ownership of such property." Acts 1992, No. 998, §1.
3. All quoted material in the opinion has been published as printed in the original
source material.
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navigable waterbottoms subject to the ebb and flow of the tide?
and
2) What changes, if any, in Louisiana law were effected by the
decision in Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi?
The Louisiana State Law Institute is directed to report its findings and recommendations on or before February 1, 1992.
In commenting upon jurisprudential developments affecting ownership of the beds of navigable waters, Joseph Dainow once observed
that, "It is in the nature of the civil law system to establish classifications
and to provide general principles in the basic texts of law, leaving to
the courts the function and the duty of determining the application of
the principles in relation to the fundamental classifications and in the
furtherance of the best interests of society (public policy). From time
to time, an extremely important issue strikes this incompletely charted
area of the law, creating doubt and disagreement as to the proper
solution." 4 Louisiana law with respect to the ownership of waterbottoms
reflects vividly this characteristic of our civilian tradition, as evidenced
by such decisions as State v. Erwin, 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931),
Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936), Humble Oil
& Refining Co. v. State Mineral Board, 223 La. 47, 64 So. 2d 839
(1953), California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1 (1954), and
Gu l f Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 317 So. 2d 576 (La. 1974). In
the tradition of this jurisprudential history, Phillips now commends to
the attention of this committee important issues regarding tidelands
ownership and the public trust.
BACKGROUND

The lands involved in the Phillips decision comprised the beds of
non-navigable waters (including eleven short, nameless drainage streams)
located several miles inland from the Gulf Coast but nonetheless subject
to tidal influence because they were adjacent and tributary to the navigable Jourdan River which flows directly into the Gulf. Notably, this
acreage comprised but 42 of the original 140 acres of tidelands challenged
in the state court proceeding. The Mississippi Supreme Court had earlier
determined that 98 acres were artificially created tidelands (caused by
road construction) and were, therefore, not affected by a public trust
which the Mississippi Supreme Court construed to apply only to tidelands
existing at the time of statehood (1817) and lands added thereto by
virtue of natural forces of accretion. See 491 So. 2d at 519-520. The
plaintiff landowners claimed title to the disputed acreage under pre-

4. Dainow, "The Work of Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1953-1954 TermProperty," 15 La. L. Rev. 273 (1955).
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statehood Spanish land grants and contended that the public trust extended only to lands underlying navigable waters. The State of Mississippi, on the other hand, claimed to have acquired in public trust at
the time of statehood the disputed acreage and all other lands lying
under waters influenced by the tide, whether navigable or not, under
the "equal footing doctrine."
In a 5-3 decision, the majority of the United States Supreme Court
determined that the public trust doctrine, derived from English common
law, had been recognized in decisions of the Court dating back to the
late nineteenth century to vest in the states, by right of sovereignty,
ownership of all lands under waters subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide. The Court acknowledged that prior cases did not deal specifically
with non-navigable tidal streams such as were involved in Phillips but
suggested that the scope of the prior rulings was nonetheless clear. The
majority determined that navigability and the protection of commerce
were not the sole interests served by the public trust doctrine, which
included such other state interests as protecting the use of such lands
for fishing and the reclamation of such lands for urban expansion,
among others. The majority specifically rejected plaintiff's suggestion
that public trust tidelands embraced only shore lands (i.e., seashore) or
lands beneath tidal waters immediately adjacent to the sea, noting that
such lands are essentially no different than non-navigable waters influenced by the ebb and flow of the tide which share those "geographical,
chemical and environmental qualities that make lands beneath tidal
waters unique." According to the majority, although non-navigable waters on the seashore are more directly related to the tides, all tidal
waters are connected to the sea, even if by a navigable tidal river.
Moreover, the majority concluded that no satisfactory alternative test
exists for tidelands classification that provides the benefit of uniformity
and certainty that exists with the ebb and flow rule.
Also significant to the result in Phillips were findings that (i) a
reasonable expectation by plaintiffs in the security of their title based
upon a record title interest and the payment of taxes on the disputed
lands for over a century was not justified by a consistent recognition
in Mississippi of public trust title to lands under tidewaters and a public
trust interest in the use of such lands beyond mere navigation and
including recreation, fishing and mineral development, and (ii) the recognition of a public trust title to the disputed lands in the State of
Mississippi would portend no sweeping changes outside of that state
because of a settled recognition that there is no uniform law on the
subject. Each State has the authority to define the limits of lands held
in public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as it sees
fit according to its own policy views.
In this regard, it is important to note that while the decision is
factually limited to lands beneath tidally-influenced non-navigable water-
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bodies, the majority decision rests in significant measure upon jurisprudence of the Court which interpreted public trust tidelands to include
all lands beneath waters influenced by the ebb and flow of the tide.'
See, for example, Mann v. Tacoma Land Co., 153 U.S. 273, 14 S. Ct.
820, 38 L. Ed. 714 (1894) involving tide flats or mud flats about threefourths of a mile from the low water line of a navigable bay which
were covered to a uniform depth according to the run of the tides at
high water and left entirely bare at low water. Moreover, the majority
commented that the scope of public trust tidelands under its decisions
had supported state law claims to dominion over lands beneath nonnavigable tidal waters such as Connecticut's claim to tidal flats adjoining
an arm of the sea and South Carolina's claim to public ownership of
salt marshes. See 108 S. Ct. at 794, n. 3.
According to the dissenting justices, the public trust doctrine, from
its common law origins, has been founded upon preserving public use
of navigable waters, fundamentally to protect commerce by preserving
the common use of such waters for transportation. Accordingly, navigability, not tidal influence, should be recognized as the universal hallmark of the public trust. The dissenting opinion argues that the public
trust parallels the scope of federal admiralty jurisdiction and properly
extends only to land underlying navigable bodies of waters and their
borders, bays and inlets. It does not extend to discrete and wholly nonnavigable waters that are properly viewed as separate from a navigable
waterbody. Navigable bodies of water for purposes of the public trust
include non-navigable areas at their boundaries (e.g., the ocean shores
over which the tide ebbs and flows), but only those waterbottoms that
may be considered part of a navigable body of water belong to the
public trust. The dissent further argues that this limitation on the scope
of the public trust is mirrored by the legislative history of the Submerged
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §1301 et seq., which reveals that Congress viewed
the States' rights in tidal waters as being defined by the boundaries of
the navigable ocean, that is, associated with and part of the rights in
lands beneath navigable waters.
Finally, the dissent finds that the majority decision is inequitable
in its recognition of a belated and opportunistic claim of the State of
Mississippi which collected taxes on the property and voiced no adverse
claim for over 150 years, and that the decision announces a rule of
property which will upset the settled expectations of countless innocent
property holders in the coastal States.

5. Under the stipulated facts, neither the Mississippi Supreme Court nor the United
States Supreme Court were required in the Phillips litigation to fix the precise outer limits
of public trust properties, beyond the broad, general principles announced in their decisions.
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ANALYSIS

According to the majority in Phillips, it has been long-established
that the individual States have the authority to define the limits of lands
held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they
see fit. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 at 26, 14 S. Ct. 548 at 557, 38
L.Ed. 331 at 341 (1894); McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70, 30 S. Ct. 27,
54 L. Ed. 95 (1909). The Court accordingly indicated that its decision
does nothing to change ownership rights in States which previously
relinquished a public trust claim to such tidelands, acknowledging that
many coastal States, as a matter of state law, have granted all or a
portion of their tidelands to adjacent upland property owners long ago.
The discussion that follows is a survey of the law of Louisiana
prior to Phillips regarding ownership of non-navigable waterbottoms
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.
I.
It is appropriate at the outset to note the various sources of title
to lands in Louisiana, which prior to cession to the United States in
1803 was alternately under French and Spanish dominion.
Since 1750 the territory of Louisiana has been the subject of three
international transfers: the transfer from France to Spain by the Treaty
of Fountainebleau on November 3, 1762, the transfer by Spain back to
France by the Treaty of St. Ildefonso on October 1, 1800, succeeded
shortly thereafter by the transfer by France to the United States by the
Treaty of Paris on April 30, 1803. The Treaty of Paris ceded to the
United States all the public and unappropriated lands within the territory.
See Board of Directors v. New Orleans Land Co., 138 La. 32, 70 So.
27 (1915); McDade v. Bossier Levee Board, 109 La. 625, 33 So. 628
(1902). Moreover, Congress required the people of the Territory of
Orleans to relinquish to the United States, under the terms of admission
of the State of Louisiana to the Union, all rights or title to the waste
or unappropriated lands lying within the territory. See State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 83 So. 421 (1919), cert. den. 246 U.S. 581, 40 S. Ct.
346, 64 L. Ed. 727 (1920). This was accomplished by a territorial
ordinance adopted in a convention of duly assembled representatives in
December, 1811.
Nonetheless, at English common law, the title and dominion in lands
flowed by the tidewaters were in the King for the benefit of the nation.
Upon the American Revolution, these rights, charged with a like trust,
were vested in the original states within their respective borders, subject
to the rights surrendered by the Constitution of the United States. Upon
the acquisition of a territory by the United States, the same title and
dominion passed to the United States, for the benefit of the whole
people, and in trust for the several states to be ultimately created out
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of the territory. The new states admitted into the Union since the
adoption of the Constitution have the same rights as the original states
in the tidewaters, and in the lands under them, within their respective
jurisdictions. These principles are the foundation for what has come to
be known as the public trust doctrine.
The United States Supreme Court accordingly declared in Shively
v. Bowiby, 152 U.S. 1, 14 S. Ct. 548, 38 L. Ed. 331 (1894):
"The Congress of the United States, in disposing of the public
lands, has constantly acted upon the theory that those lands,
whether in the interior or on the coast, above high-water mark,
may be taken up by actual occupants, in order to encourage
the settlement of the country, but that the navigable waters and
the soils under them, whether within or above the ebb and flow
of the tide, shall be and remain public highways; and, being
chiefly valuable for the public purposes of commerce, navigation
and fishery, and for the improvements necessary to secure and
promote those purposes, shall not be granted away during the
period of territorial government, but, unless in case of some
international duty or public exigency, shall be held by the United
States in trust for the future states, and shall vest in the several
states, when organized and admitted into the Union, with all
the powers and prerogatives appertaining to the older states in
regard to such waters and soils within their respective jurisdictions; in short, shall not be disposed of piecemeal to individuals,
as private property, but shall be held as a whole for the purpose
of being ultimately administered and dealt with for the public
benefit by the State, after it shall have become a completely
organized community." See 14 S. Ct. at 566.
Notably, an earlier case before the United States Supreme Court, New
Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662, 9 L. Ed. 573 (1836), had placed
at issue the title of the United States under the Treaty of Paris to a
quay in the City of New Orleans (i.e., a vacant space of land between
the first row of buildings and the water's edge reserved as a common
for the reception of goods and merchandise imported or to be exported).
Noting the Civil Code designation of the quay as common property and
the designation of the property under the laws and usages of the former
French and Spanish sovereigns as lands dedicated to a public use and
insusceptible of private ownership so long as such use continued, the
Court observed that by the Treaty of Paris, the territory of Louisiana
was ceded to the United States in full sovereignty, and in every respect,
with all its rights and appurtenances, as it was held by the Republic of
France, and as it was received by that Republic from Spain. The Court
moreover observed that from the abrogation of the French laws in
Louisiana by O'Reilly in 1769, until the country came into the possession
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of the United States, the laws of Spain governed the rights in the lands
in controversy. 6 Recognizing the common in question, under Spanish
law, to be part of the public domain by dedication to public use and
thereby inalienable, the Court concluded that the Treaty of Paris conferred no title to the common in the United States. The Court stated:
"The State of Louisiana was admitted into the Union, on the
same footing as the original states. Her rights of sovereignty
are the same, and by consequence no jurisdiction of the federal
government, either for purposes of police or otherwise, can be
exercised over this public ground, which is not common to the
United States. It belongs to the local authority to enforce the
trust, and prevent what they shall deem a violation of it by the
city authorities.
All powers which properly appertain to sovereignty, which have
not been delegated to the federal government, belong to the
states and the people." 35 U.S. 662 at 737, 9 L. Ed. 573 at
602.
The Court accordingly concluded that neither the fee of the land in
controversy nor the right to regulate its use was vested in the federal
government. The decision thus suggests that properties classified as common or public and inalienable by dedication to public use under the
regime of laws of the previous sovereigns in force in 1803 did not pass
to the United States by the Treaty of Paris (to be transferred by the
United States to Louisiana in 1812 subject to the limitations of the
common law public trust doctrine) but that the title to and limitations
on ownership and use of such property remained subject to the laws
governing the Territory of Orleans at the time of the Treaty of Paris
as subsequently modified and acted upon by the sovereign state. Principles relied upon by the Court in the New Orleansdecision are, however,
open to question under later pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in Shively, in which the Court declared that by the Constitution, the United States, having rightfully acquired the territories,
and being the only government which can impose laws upon them, has
the entire dominion and sovereignty, national and municipal, federal
and state, over all the territories, so long as they remain in a territorial
condition and that Congress hasthe power to make grants of lands
below the high-water mark of navigable waters in any territory of the
United States, whenever it becomes necessary to do so in order to

6. According to the Court, the retrocession of the country from Spain to France,
and the cession of France to the United States followed so soon afterwards as to cause
no interruption to the laws of Spain. See generally in this regard, Dart, The Influence
of the Ancient Laws of Spain on the Jurisprudence of Louisiana, 6 Tul. L. Rev. 83
(1931).
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perform international obligations, or to effect the improvement of such
lands for the promotion and convenience of commerce with foreign
nations and among the several states, or to carry out other public
purposes appropriate to the objects for which the United States holds
the territory. See 14 S. Ct. at 565.
II.
Relying largely upon the pronouncements of Shively, the United
States Supreme Court in Phillips has indicated that Louisiana acquired
by right of sovereignty upon its admission to the Union not only the
beds of navigable waters but all lands under water that were subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide up to the high water mark of 1812.1 In
this regard, the only limitation stipulated in the act for the admission
of Louisiana into the Union was that the Mississippi River and the
navigable rivers and waters leading into same or into the Gulf of Mexico
shall be common highways and forever free to the citizens of the United
States without tax, duty, impost or toll. Act of February 20, 1811; 2
Stat. 642.
Preceding Louisiana's admission into the Union, the territorial legislature enacted on March 31, 1808, "A Digest of the Civil Laws Now
in Force in the Territory of Orleans, With Alterations and Amendments
Adapted to its Present Form of Government." Borrowing from Roman
law sources, the 1808 Digest classified property according to its susceptibility or insusceptibility of ownership. Arts. 2, 3 and 6 (1808). The
sea and its shores were classified as "common" things not susceptible
of ownership, seashore comprising the space of land upon which the
waters of the sea are spread in the highest water during the winter
season. Arts. 3 and 4 (1808). Navigable rivers and their beds were
classified as public things8 subject to public use and were thereby insusceptible of private ownership, while the banks of navigable rivers

7. Note that in Louisiana, prestatehood grants by foreign sovereigns may sustain
claims of private ownership of public trust lands included in such grants. See Yiannopolous,
Five Babes Lost in the Tide-A Saga of Land Titles in Two States: Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Mississippi, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 1357 at 1359 (1988).
8. Note that the classification of river beds as "public" does not necessarily mean
the vesting of full title in the State. Under pre-existing French and Spanish law in Louisiana,
the beds of navigable rivers were wholly insusceptible of private ownership, whether by
the State or by any other person. Louisiana courts have nonetheless relied upon the codal
classification and the doctrine of inherent sovereignty as indicating that the beds of
navigable rivers are insusceptible of ownership by private persons but belong in full title
to the State. See A. Yiannopoulos, Common, Public and Private Things in Louisiana:
Civilian Tradition and Modern Practice, 21 La. L. Rev. 697, n. 112, 114 (1961); Morgan
v. Livingston, 6 Martin (O.S.) 19 (1819); Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637
(1922); Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936).
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belonged to the riparian owners subject to public use. Arts. 6, 8 (1808).
These provisions were carried into the Louisiana Civil Codes of 1825
and 1870. Arts. 440-444, 446 (1825); Arts. 449-453, 455 (1870).
Note that the Digest of 1808, like succeeding codes prior to the
1978 revision, declared simply that the beds of navigable rivers, so long
as they are covered with water, are public things. State ownership of
the beds of other navigable waters such as lakes, bays and sounds has
been founded upon statutory legislation enacted since the middle of the
last century, the doctrine of inherent sovereignty and a broad interpretation of the Code provision establishing the beds of navigable rivers
as public things. In this regard, Professor Yiannopoulos suggests that:
"The doctrine of 'inherent sovereignty' is a judicial construction
of dubious antiquity designed to rationalize state 'ownership' of
the bottoms of navigable waters. According to this doctrine, the
original states in the Union took sovereignty over all navigable
waters within their territories from the British Crown. Subsequent
admissions to the Union were on an equal basis. For this reason,
Louisiana in 1812 took ownership of all navigable waters within
the state. The historical and dogmatic premises of the doctrine
have been questioned repeatedly; yet, it seems to be still determinative of the outcome in most cases involving disputed ownership of riparian lands and waterbottoms.
Actually, the doctrine of inherent sovereignty confuses sovereignty and ownership ('imperium' and 'dominium') and accords
with obscure medievel conceptions rather than ancient Roman
law or continental civil law. State sovereignty naturally extends
over all property situated within its borders-and not only over
navigable waters. State property, on the other hand, may be
acquired in accordance with the provisions governing acquisition
of ownership in general, or in accordance with legislation proclaiming state title over property belonging to no one in particular. It is confusing to talk of deriving 'ownership' from
'sovereignty'.
Further, it is difficult to see how Louisiana took an original
title to the bottoms of navigable waters by its mere admission
to the Union. The only mention of navigable waters, at that
time, was the following: 'the river Mississippi and navigable
rivers and waters leading into the same or into the Gulf of
Mexico, shall be common highways and for ever free, as well
to the inhabitants of the said states as to other citizens of the
United States, without any tax, duty, impost or toll therefor,
imposed by the said state.' Thus, clearly, there was no federal
grant of ownership on the beds of navigable rivers, or, ,for that
matter, on the bottoms of any navigable waters. Nor did the
admission on an equal basis mean that Louisiana had to follow
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the common law rule that the state is owner of the beds of
navigable rivers and lakes. Indeed, there are common law states
that do not follow this rule. Thus, the doctrine of inherent
sovereignty may simply explain state sovereignty ('imperium')
over all navigable waters and water bottoms, a self-evident fact.
It may also explain state ownership ('dominium') of waters and
beds owned by no one at the time the doctrine was first announced. But it cannot explain the vesting of title in the state
over navigable waters and beds at the time Louisiana was admitted into the Union.
Finally, it is apparently on the basis of Article 453 of the Civil
Code that the state claims ownership of the beds of navigable
waters other than rivers, although that article mentions only
'navigable rivers.' Analogous application of Article 453 to other
bodies of water is, perhaps, the least questionable basis of
exclusive state rights since the period preceding statehood. The
public interest protected by Article 453 is the free use of navigable waters for transportation and other commercial purposes.
And if, as a guaranty of that interest, ownership of the beds
of navigable rivers should be vested in the state, for the same
reasons, ownership of the bottoms of other navigable waters
might be vested in the state." Yiannopoulos, Common, Public
and Private Things in Louisiana: Civilian Tradition and Modern
Practice, 21 La. Law. Rev., 697 at 713-720 (1961); see also A.
Yiannopoulos, 2 La. Civil Law Treatise, Property (3rd Ed.) §65
(1991); Comment, The Public and the Private Domains of the
State, 12 Tul. Law Rev. 428 (1938).
Note also that no provision in the 1808 Digest determined ownership
of the beds of non-navigable rivers, although the source law suggests
that these bottoms were regarded as res nullius, i.e., things susceptible
of private ownership that belong to no one in particular. Thus, Articles
13 through 17 of the Digest necessarily addressed rights of riparian
owners in both navigable and non-navigable streams with respect to
alluvion, dereliction and avulsion. These provisions, with later additions
addressing islands and sand bars formed in non-navigable streams, corresponded to provisions of the Code Napoleon.
Though outside the public domain, the beds of non-navigable streams
were not recognized as belonging to the riparian owner under French
jurisprudence until an Act of 8 April 1898 established riparian ownership
of such riverbeds. By contrast, Louisiana courts have historically recognized riparian ownership of the beds of non-navigable streams. See,
generally, A. Yiannopoulos, 2 La. Civ. Law. Treatise, Property (3rd
ed.) §§63, 78 (1991); 2 Aubry & Rau, Droit Civil Francais, §§168-178
(7th ed. Esmein 1961).
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Keep in mind also that running water is distinguished under our
Civil Code from the bed that contains it. Running water was originally
classified in the 1808 Digest as a "common" thing insusceptible of
ownership and remains insusceptible of private ownership by classification in our present Code as a public thing subject to public use. Art.
3 (1808); Art. 450 as revised in 1978. Thus, the bed of a non-navigable
river is a private thing, while the water within it is a public thing subject
to public use. By contrast, the bed of a navigable river or stream is a
public thing, as is the water within it. See A. Yiannopoulos, 2 La. Civil
Law Treatise, Property (3rd ed.) §57 (1991). Regarding the extent of
public rights to the use of running waters, see C.C. Art. 452; R.S.
9:1101; Chaney v. State Mineral Board, 444 So. 2d 105 (La. 1983);
Brown v. Rougon, 552 So. 2d 1052 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989), writ
denied. Note also C.C. Art. 658.
Accordingly, under the laws in place upon Louisiana's admission to
the Union in 1812, the only limitation upon private ownership of waterbottoms extended to the beds of navigable waters, the sea and its
shores. It is important to note in this regard, that while the limits of
the public trust title in the bottoms of navigable waters that inured to
Louisiana by right of inherent sovereignty extended to the high water
line of 1812, state law recognized private ownership of the banks of
navigable rivers and streams subject to a right of public use. Article 89
of the 1808 Digest thus declared that the use of the shores of navigable
rivers or creeks is public but that the property of the river shores belongs
to those who possess the adjoining lands. See Arts. 446, 448 (1825);
Arts. 455, 457 (1870); Art. 456, as revised in 1978; Morgan v. Livingston,
6 Mart. (O.S.) 19 (1819); State v. Richardson, 140 La. 329, 72 So. 984
(1946); Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637 (1922); Smith v.
Dixie Oil Co., 156 La. 691, 101 So. 24 (1924). The bank of a stream
is recognized by our jurisprudence and codal law to be the area between
the ordinary low and ordinary high stages of water (except where there
is a levee in proximity to the water); and, according to well-settled
jurisprudence, the servitude of public use extended by the Code is limited
to purposes that are incidental to the navigable character of the stream
and its enjoyment as an avenue of commerce. See State v. Richardson,
140 La. 329, 72 So. 984 (1916); Comment (b) to C.C. Art. 456 as
revised in 1978.
In this regard, the subservience of the federal public trust title to
state law property concepts is demonstrated in State v. Richardson,
supra, in which a state claim to sovereign title in the beds of navigable
waters to the ordinary high water mark was rejected in view of conflicting
state law principles which recognized private ownership of the banks of

9.

"Articles" in original.
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navigable streams and in which the Louisiana Supreme Court also observed:
"The property of the bed is, however, in the public, and inalienable, only so long as the bed remains covered by water;
and, when the water leaves the bed, as such uncovered, its
ownership is regulated by provisions of the state law to the
effect that, if the river finds another bed, the owners of the
soil thus occupied take the old bed; if the bed be only partially
uncovered, and an island be formed in a navigable stream, it
belongs to the state, or, in a stream not navigable, to the owners
of the lands upon either side.
... Our conclusions may then be stated as follows.
The state of Louisiana, in virtue of her sovereignty, became the
owner of all lands underlying the navigable waters within her
territory, below mean high-water mark, with power to determine
the rights of riparian proprietors with respect thereto, subject
only to the limitations imposed by, and under, the Constitution
of the United States; and, in the exercise of that power, she
has enacted laws which have been read into the titles of all
lands bordering upon such waters and which declare, in effect,
that the property of the beds of navigable streams is in the
public, so long as they are covered with water; that the banks
are "that which contains" the river, in its ordinary state of
high water, and belong to the adjacent proprietor, subject to a
servitude of use in favor of the public; that the accretions which
are formed, successively and imperceptibly, to any soil constituting the shore of any river or stream, are called alluvion, and
belong to the owner of such soil, who is bound to leave public
that portion of the bank required by law.
Construing those various provisions of the law together, and
with reference to the doctrine, here propounded on behalf of
the state, that all lands between the banks of a river, below
mean high-water mark, constitute its bed, it is evident that the
law and the doctrine cannot stand together, and equally evident
that, in the enactment of the law, the state has not intended
that they should stand together, but has established an exception
to the doctrine, and such is the well founded and settled jurisprudence of this court, from which it appears that batture and
alluvion, lying between the banks of navigable rivers, below the
ordinary stages of high water, have been, for a century and
more, occupied, leased, mortgaged, sold, and litigated over, as
property the title to which was vested in individuals and private
corporations; that, in no case, has this court ever held, or
intimated, that an alluvion which was shown to appear above
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the surface of the water, at its ordinary stage, with a reasonable
appearance of permanence and identification with the soil of
the shore, was part of the bed of the river, or for that, or any,
reason was not susceptible of private ownership .... ." 72 So.
984, at 990-991.
By Act 247 of 1855, the Louisiana Legislature authorized the sale of
swamp and overflowed lands donated by Congress to the State under
the Swamp Land Grant Acts of 1849 and 1850,10 as well as shallow
non-navigable lakes which had become the property of the State and
were susceptible of being reclaimed. The Louisiana Supreme Court in
McDade v. Bossier Levee Board," 109 La. 625, 33 So. 628 (1902)
recognized that the latter category of land was within the purview of
the swamp land grants as "overflowed lands." Proceeds from the sale
of lands under Act 247 were deposited in a special fund to be applied
to the cost of levee construction and drainage. Act 124 of 1862 assimilated dried out navigable lakes to swamp land (thereby opening such
waterbottoms to sale) through its stipulation that all lakes which by
natural causes become dry land over which surveys of the State may
be extended shall be regarded as swamp lands of the same character as
those donated to the State under the Swamp Land Grant Acts of 1849
and 1850. Act No. 38 of 1870 (extra session) re-enacted the 1855 statuts
and authorized private entry and sale at the rate of 25C per acre of
those public lands donated by Congress which are subject to regular
tidal overflow and which have been approved to the State of Louisiana
by the general government as swamp and overflowed lands. See also
Act 104 of 1871 and Act 75 of 1880 which similarly authorized the
entry and sale of public lands donated to Louisiana by Congress, including those designated as sea marsh or prairie, subject to tidal overflow, so as to render them unfit for settlement and cultivation.
As with previous statutes, Act 75 of 1880 provided a different sales
price for separate categories of lands. Ordinary swamp lands, subject
to overflow, generally located some distance inland from lands adjacent

10. Act March 2, 1849, c. 87, 9 Stat. 352 and Act Sept. 28, 1850, c. 84, 9 Stat.
519; see 43 U.S.C.A. §981 et seq. The purpose of the federal swamp land grants was to
aid the State of Louisiana in constructing the necessary levees and drains to reclaim the
swamp and overflowed lands within the state. See, for example, 43 U.S.C.A. §§982, 983.
While sales of swamp and overflowed lands were initially conducted by the Register of
the State Land Office, commencing in 1886 various levee districts were created by the
State and land grants made to each as an instrumentality to accomplish the sale of state
lands and application of the proceeds to the completion of a levee system. See, for
example, Act 74 of 1892 and 160 of 1900; Act 18 of 1894 and 205 of 1910; State v.
Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604, 50 So. 405 (1912); Madden, Federal and State
Lands in Louisiana (1973) at p. 291-296.

11.

"Levee District" in original.
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to the shore line, were subject to entry and sale at 75¢ per acre, while
sea marsh or prairie, subject to tidal overflow, so as to render them
unfit for settlement and cultivation, was subject to entry and sale at
12-1/2 12 per acre. See Sections 10 and 11 of Act 75 of 1880; Madden,
Federal and State Lands in Louisiana, (1973) at page 294. Note in this
regard that Congress did not use the term "tidal" in either of the
Swamp Land Grant Acts of 1849 and 1850, indicating that it did not
matter how lands became overflowed or for what reason or by what
source, so long as they were overflowed or at least subject to periodic
overflow, requiring levees or embankments to keep out the water and
to make them suitable for cultivation. The term "overflowed lands"
within the Swamp Land Acts has also been judicially recognized as
including within the grant submerged lands which as a permanent condition are overflowed. See McDade, supra. 13 Such lands existed in 1849
and 1850 not only in the deltaic formations along the shores of the
Gulf, but also along lakes, rivers and bayous miles inland from the
Gulf and even within low and depressed areas extending into North
Louisiana. See generally Madden, supra, pages 259-297.
In this regard, courts have interpreted Act 75 of 1880, in authorizing
the sale of sea marsh, subject to tidal overflow, as including only lands
donated to Louisiana under the swamp land grants and not "lands
within the tidewaters of the sea" which inured to the State by right of
sovereignty upon its admission to the Union. See State v. Capdeville,
146 La. 94, 83 So. 421 (1919), cert. den. 246 U.S. 581, 40 S. Ct. 346,
64 L. Ed. 727 (1920); State v. Sweet Lake Land and Oil Co., 164 La.
14
240, 113 So. 833 (1927).
On the basis of these statutes, patents [were] issued by the State
which frequently involved large areas containing both non-navigable and
navigable waters. Until 1886, the only limitation on the ability of the
State to alienate navigable or non-navigable waterbottoms could be found
in the provisions of the Civil Code which declared navigable waterbottoms and the sea and its shores to be insusceptible of private ownership.
The first direct legislative prohibition of alienation of state owned wa-

12. "Twelve and one halve" in original.
13. The Federal Bureau of Land Management recognizes tidelands to comprise coastal
areas situated above mean low tide and below mean high tide, particularly as they are
alternately covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the daily tides. Coastal marshes
that are not covered by the daily tide are regarded as swamp and overflow lands within
the meaning of the swampland grants and are subject to survey. See Yiannopoulos, 62
Tul. L. Rev. 1357 at 1361, n. 24.
14. The Sweet Lake decision suggests nonetheless that a transfer under the swamp
land grants will preempt any challenge to the actual character of the waterbottoms as
lands within the tidewaters of the sea and that "tidewaters of the sea" are constrained
by jurisprudential limits recognized in Morgan, Burns, and Salinovich.
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terbottoms is found in Act 106 of 1886, the first of the so-called "Oyster
Statutes." Section 1 of the Act provided:
".. . all the beds of the rivers, bayous, creeks, lakes, coves,
inlets and sea marshes bordering on the Gulf of Mexico, and
all that part of the Gulf of Mexico within the jurisdiction of
this State, and not heretofore sold or conveyed by special grants
or by sale by this State, or by the United States to any private
party or parties, shall continue and remain the property of the
State of Louisiana, and may be used as a common by all the
people of the State for the purposes of fishing and of taking
and catching oysters and other shell fish, subject to the reservations and restrictions hereinafter imposed, and no grant or
sale, or conveyance shall hereafter be made by the Register of
the State Land office to any estate, or interest of the State in
any natural oyster bed or shoal, whether the said bed or shoal
5
shall ebb bare or not.'
Independent of the codal scheme which recognized a "public" or
"common" right or interest with respect to navigable rivers, the sea
and its shores, this Act, designed to protect, regulate and develop the
oyster industry in the State, is perhaps the first legislative enactment to
recognize a public interest in coastal waterbottoms not directly associated
with the navigability of the waterbody. Yet this legislation, like other
statutes enacted by the Louisiana legislature since the middle of the past
century, did not regard the public interest in such waterbodies as protected by an original inalienable public trust title in the State as its
effect was expressly limited to the recognition of a State title in waterbottoms not previously conveyed into private ownership.
In Morgan v. Negodich, 6 40 La. Ann. 246, 3 So. 636 (1888), the
Louisiana Supreme Court considered an action under Act 106 of 1886
by an 1878 patentee of 800 acres of tidal overflow lands traversed by
Bayou Cook in lower Plaquemines Parish. Plaintiff claimed the exclusive

15. Note that the express prohibition against grant, sale or conveyance by the State
in the early oyster statutes extended only to natural oyster beds or shoals and was later
expanded in Act 153 of 1902 to include the beds of all affected waterbottoms. Marginal
annotations to the original Act suggest a design to encourage the planting of oyster beds
in existing state-owned waterbottoms from the stock of natural oyster reefs. Apparently,
many of the oyster beds in coastal waters west of the Mississippi River were thus planted
with oysters from natural reefs located in areas east of the Mississippi River. In this
regard, the successful propagation of oysters requires, among other things, a mixture of
both fresh and salt water to achieve the proper salinity; thus not all water bodies are
suitable for oyster cultivation. For an interesting account of the oyster industry and its

early development in Louisiana, see Waldo, The Louisiana Oyster Story (Louisiana Conservationist 1953) and Vujnovich, Yugoslavs in Louisiana.
16. "Negodish" in original.
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right to use of Bayou Cook for the planting of oysters and other shell
fish under Section 2 of Act 106 as against the claims of fisherman to
use of the bed of Bayou Cook and its shores as a common. Section 2
of Act 106 declared that the owner of lands traversed by any river,
bay, lake, bayou, cove, inlet or pass comprised within the limits of his
lawful survey shall have the exclusive right to use the beds of such
waters to plant oysters or other shellfish. Noting that the evidence did
not clearly show the extent to which the ebb and flow of the tides of
the gulf affected the lands on the shores of Bayou Cook, or whether
or not the oyster beds therein were at any time bared by the ebb tide,
the Court nonetheless found that the salt water in Bayou Cook did not
result from overflow occasioned by the high tides flooding its banks
but entered first an adjoining bay, combining in Bayou Cook with fresh
water derived from the Mississippi River, which then floods the banks
of Bayou Cook and passes into the adjoining marsh to be returned to
the Gulf at low tides. The Court 7 concluded that under the criterion
of the Code Bayou Cook and its banks were not an arm of the sea
or seashore (i.e., common property) and that the land in question was
therefore susceptible of private ownership, noting that "[t]he Legislature
has, by very strong implication, recognized the right of property therein
as vested in private individuals."
Subsequent reenactments of Act 106 of 1886 brought significant and
sometimes confusing modifications, reflective perhaps of the uncertainty
and difficulty in delimiting public versus private rights in non-navigable,
tidal waterbottoms. For example, Act 110 of 1892 eliminated "sea
marshes" from coverage under the Act and removed the former qualification of the Act to waterbottoms not heretofore sold or conveyed
by the State or the United States to private parties. Act 153 of 1902
expanded the list of affected waters to include "lagoons, bays and
sounds," expanded affected waterbottoms to include those either bordering on "or connecting with" the Gulf," and expanded the common

17. "Cook" in original.
18. Previous statutes indicated that affected waterbottoms comprised only those bordering on the Gulf of Mexico (e.g., waterbottoms which might generally be regarded as
arms of the sea or which otherwise provided a direct outlet to the Gulf), and it is
questionable whether a significant expansion beyond the coverage of the former acts was
intended in view of the stipulation in the title to Act 52 of an intent to declare "the
ownership of the State in and to the bottom or beds of the bodies or streams of water
along the Coast of the Gulf of Mexico." There is limited jurisprudence on the matter,
although Realty Operators v. State Mineral Board, 202 La. 398, 12 So. 2d 198 (1943)
recognized that a fresh water lake in Terrebonne Parish not connected with any arm of
the sea did not fall within the prohibitions of Acts 106 of 1886, 153 of 1902 and 52 of
1904. See also Stevens v. State Mineral Board, 221 So. 2d 645 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969),
reversed on procedural grounds 254 La. 452, 223 So. 2d 866 (1970) relative to Black Bay
and Breton Sound, and Winkler v. State, 239 So. 2d 484 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970) relative
to Quarantine Bay in Plaquemines Parish.
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uses of the waterbottoms to include the bedding and raising of oysters
and other shell fish. For an interpretation of the 1902 statute, see Sinclair
Oil & Gas Company v. Delacroix Corp., 285 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1973), in which the Court held that two major limitations in the
Act restricted the geographical area to which it applied: (1) the water
bottom must border on or connect with the Gulf of Mexico and (2)
the purpose of the Act (to establish, protect and regulate the oyster
fishing industry) was such that it intends to encompass only those
waterbottoms which may reasonably be considered as suitable for oyster
cultivation.
Curiously, commencing with Act 121 of 1896 through the modern
statutes, the oyster acts declared that the rights of riparian owners along
the various waterbottoms affected thereby shall extend to the ordinary
low water mark. Act 52 of 1904 made a particular declaration that no
one shall own in fee simple the bottoms of navigable waters, which was
modified in subsequent acts to include the bottoms of any of the
waterbodies covered by the act. Section 10 of Act 178 of 1906 limited
the authority of the Oyster Commission to lease affected waterbottoms
to those not claimed under some title by any person (excluding bottoms
not previously alienated by the State or those which were then in
litigation). Any attempted lease was deemed invalid until there was an
adjudication between the State and private claimant as to the validity
of the title to the waterbottom. This limitation was modified in Act
189 of 1910 and subsequent acts to declare that adverse private claims
to affected waterbottoms shall not be valid or effective until adjudicated
between the State and claimant and to recognize a right of action in
the claimant for the determination of such claims.' 9 See generally La.
Acts 1886, No. 106; La. Acts 1870, No. 18; La. Acts 1892, No. 110;
La. Acts 1896, No. 121; La. Acts 1902, No. 153; La. Acts 1904, No.
52, as amended by La. Acts 1906, No. 178; La. Acts 1908, Nos. 167
and 291; La. Acts 1910, No. 189; La. Acts 1914, No. 54, as amended
by La. Acts 1924, No. 139; La. Acts 1932, No. 67; see now La. R.S.
41:14 and R.S. 56:3.

In Chauvin v. Louisiana Oyster Commission,
38 (1908), the owners of a parcel of land which
bed of a saltwater bay ranging from 1 to 5 feet in
through bayous with the Gulf of Mexico (and thus

121 La. 10, 46 So.
included part of the
depth and connecting
subject to the regular

19. These provisions were noted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in California Co.
v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d I at 6-7 (1954) and construed as a legislative recognition
that there might be title claims outstanding to affected waterbottoms under attempted
sales or grants by the State requiring a judicial determination of the claims, as to which
the court noted that claims predicated on an authorized patent covering affected waterbottoms might be decreed valid under the prescriptive limitations for assailing patents
under Act 62 of 1912.

1992]

LAW INSTITUTE OPINION

ebb and flow of the tide) sought to enjoin the Louisiana Oyster Commission from leasing the submerged areas for fisheries or other purposes.
The land in question was selected by and granted to the State as swamp
and overflowed land under the swamp land grants of 1849 and 1850
and sold by the State to plaintiff's ancestor in title in 1876. The Oyster
Commission argued that the bottom of the bay comprised lands which
20
belonged to Louisiana by virtue of her sovereignty, that the state had
given no authority to her officers for the alienation of such waterbottoms
and that the title claimed by plaintiffs was an absolute nullity. The trial
court determined that the bay was not a navigable highway leading to
the Gulf of Mexico and that even if it was, the State had the right to
sell the submerged portion subject only to the right of navigation in
the public. The trial court also ruled that the State was estopped to
challenge the character of the lands conveyed as being other than swamp
or overflowed land.
On original hearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that for
more than half a century the United States and the State of Louisiana
acquiesced in the character of the land as swamp and overflowed land
susceptible to patent but that the Oyster Commission now assails the
patents as absolute nullities "on the novel ground that a portion of the
tract conveyed consisted of a tidal water bottom." 121 La. 10, 46 So.
38, at p. 39 (1908). The Court also noted that Act No. 178 of 1906
specifically excepted from the jurisdiction of the Oyster Commission
water bottoms claimed under some title by any person, firm, or corporation until there shall have been an adjudication by a court of
competent jurisdiction between the State and the claimant as to the
validity of the title to the property, revealing a legislative intent that
the sovereign first proceed to court and assail by direct action adverse
titles to the waterbottoms suitable for oyster production and cultivation.
The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the lower court,
finding in part that acceptance by the State of lands certified to it by
the Secretary of the Interior as "swamp and overflowed" was conclusive
upon the State as to the title to and character of lands so certified and
subsequently sold by the State as such.
On rehearing, the Court reviewed the legislative history and affirmed
its prior decree, holding that the Oyster Commission was not empowered
to stand in judgment for the State regarding the validity of plaintiffs'
title or to speak for the State to deny its authority to part with title
or attack its patents on the basis that the common right of fishing or
bedding oysters within the ebb and flow of the tide is inalienable.
In Louisiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Commission of Louisiana,
125 La. 740, 51 So. 706 (1910), the limitations upon private property

20.

"had been" in original.
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rights in lands within potential reach of the oyster statutes were framed
around the traditional limitations affecting navigable waters, the sea and
its shores under the Civil Code. The plaintiff claimed title to submerged
and swamp and overflowed lands forming part of the peninsula of St.
Bernard Parish which projects into the Gulf of Mexico (including the
waterbottoms of Creole Pass and Grand Pass) under an 1894 deed
deraigned from patents issued previously by the State of Louisiana.
Plaintiff sought to enjoin an alleged slander of title and trespass by the
Oyster Commission and its licensees on portions of the property, including Grand Pass, for oyster fishing and to enjoin threats of arrest
and prosecution by the Oyster Commission under color of Act 52 of
1904 and Act 178 of 1906. Appeal was taken from a trial court judgment
sustaining an exception of no cause of action.
The Oyster Commission contended that the submerged lands claimed
by plaintiff were a part of the public domain which it was charged to
administer. In this regard, the Louisiana Supreme Court commented
upon the historic origins of sovereign title to navigable and tide waters.
The Court observed that according to the common law of England,
there is no navigable water save that which is within the ebb and flow
of the tide, while in this country, where rivers are navigable far above
the limits of the tide waters a different test was required which regards
all streams as navigable in the legal sense which are navigable in fact.
Recognizing the codal prohibition against private ownership of the
bed of a navigable river and a fortiori of the bed of the sea or of an
arm of the sea, the Court concluded that the exception of no cause of
action was properly granted as to that portion of plaintiff's lands bordering on and partially surrounded by the tidewaters of the Gulf of
Mexico up to the high water mark and as to lands lying beneath navigable
passes or channels which intersect or separate the tracts of dry land
included in plaintiff's grant but that a cause of action was or may be
shown with respect to the dry land and such "non-navigable streams,
pools, ponds and wet places, so insignificant in dimensions and so within
the border of the dry land covered by plaintiff's grants that plaintiff
would be entitled to hold them, as included therein" (citing Burns v.
Crescent Gun and Rod Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So. 249 (1906), which
notably had recognized, inter alia, that it is because navigable rivers
afford a way of communicating that the legislature has placed them in
the public domain and that the civil law is very plain regarding the
reach of the "shore" of the sea-the shore is limited to that space of
land on the borders of the sea which is at times covered by the rising,
and at other times left dry by the falling, tide and includes only the
lands along the sea or the ocean and does not extend back from the
one or the other).
By Act 258 of 1910, effective August 12, 1910 (now La. R.S. 9:1101),
the State of Louisiana asserted ownership of the waters and beds of all
bayous, lagoons, lakes and bays within the borders of the State not

19921

LAW INSTITUTE OPINION

then under the direct ownership of any person, firm or corporation.
The Act separately declared State ownership of the beds of navigable
streams, provided "this Act is not intended to interfere with the acquisition in good faith of any waters or the beds thereof transferred
by the State or its agencies prior to the passage of this Act." The
reference to navigable "streams" in the second part of the Act was
restated to navigable "waters" in the reenactment of the statute by Act
No. 443 of 1954. Notably, unlike the oyster statutes, Act 258 of 1910
did not expressly prohibit the transfer of affected waterbottoms by the
state to private persons.2
Act 258 was interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State
v. Board of Commissioners of the Caddo Levee District, 188 La. 1,
175 So. 678 (1937), to evidence a legislative intent to retake title (to
the extent lawfully necessary) to the beds of both non-navigable and
navigable waters where they not been conveyed to the several levee
boards of the State and where the rights of third parties had not
intervened, to the extent that such waterbottoms were embraced within
the statutory land grants previously made by the State to the levee
districts. According to the Court:
"Act No. 258 of 1910 by its terms clearly manifests the legislative
intention to establish a uniform and mandatory rule or system
as to the ownership of the waters and beds of the bayous,
lagoons, lakes, rivers and bays within the State, where they were
not under the direct ownership of any private person, firm, or
corporation, and where they had not been previously transferred
by the State. Excluding the lands subject to private ownership
and the lands previously transferred by the State, there were
left only those the ownership of which was of necessity in the
State, as to which no decllration by the Legislature was necessary, and those granted, but not actually transferred, to the
several levee boards, as to which a legislative declaration was
necessary to put back the title in the State." 188 La. 1, 175
So. 678, at 681.
In his dissent, Chief Justice O'Niell commented:
"At the time when Act No. 258 of 1910 was enacted the beds
of the nonnavigable bodies of water in Louisiana had no value,
if separated in ownership from the lands of which they formed

21. As noted by one commentator, "It does not appear that Act 258 of 1910 was
intended to unalterably vest title to the beds of these waters in the state, and to set up
an absolute prohibition against their future alienation by the state to a private owner,"
but, subject to the curative effects of Act 62 of 1912, to preclude their future alienation
by mere inclusion within or implication from the general terms of a conveyance. See
Comment, Ownership of the Beds of Navigable Lakes, 21 Tul. L. Rev. 454, 469-470
(1947). But see Winkler v. State, 239 So. 2d 484 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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a part. It is, therefore, impossible to imagine what motive the
Legislature could have had at that time for desiring to sever
the title for the beds of her nonnavigable bodies of water from
the title for the lands of which these nonnavigable water bottoms
formed a part .... If the Legislature had intended by the act
of 1910 to separate the ownership of the beds of her nonnavigable bodies of water from the ownership of the lands embracing them, the state engineers would have been busy all these
twenty-seven years, surveying and separating, from the adjacent
lands, these shapeless stripes and spots of water-covered land
which the State is said to have withdrawn from the grants to
the levee boards. The effect of this decision will be to destroy
the titles of all who have bought from the levee boards lands
for which the levee boards obtained their instruments of conveyance after the act of 1910 was enacted, as far as the beds
of nonnavigable bodies of water forming parts of such lands
are concerned." 188 La. 1, 175 So. 678, at 687-688.
The legislative intent suggested by the Caddo Court was clarified with
respect to the beds and bottoms of navigable waters only by the legislative
amendment of Act 258 by Act 443 of 1954.22 As with Act 106 of 1886,
the recognition in Act 258 of 1910 that its effect did not extend to
waterbottoms under direct private ownership on the effective date of
the statute is arguably an implicit recognition of the State's right to
convey non-navigable waterbottoms, inconsistent with the notion of an
inalienable public trust title in such lands beyond existing state law
limitations affecting beds of navigable waters, the sea and its shores.
Absent such public trust limitations, these statutes could not be constitutionally applied to divest private ownership rights in such lands
which had already vested on the effective date of the statute. See, e.g.,
California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1, at 7 (1954).23

22. The amendment provided in pertinent part:
"All transfers and conveyances or purported transfers and conveyances made
by the state of Louisiana to any levee district of the state of any navigable
waters and the beds and bottoms thereof are hereby rescinded, revoked and
canceled."
23. Louisiana constitutions since 1812 have prohibited the legislature from passing
any ex post facto law or any law impairing the obligations of contracts and, commencing
in 1868, prohibited divestiture of vested rights except for purposes of public utility and
for adequate compensation paid. See Art. VI, Sec. 20, 1812 Constitution; Art. 110 of
the 1868 Constitution;. Art. IV, Sec. 15 of the 1921 Constitution and Art. I, Sec. 23 of
the 1974 Constitution which omitted the provision regarding divesting vested rights, a
matter already proscribed by the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Amend.
XIV, Sec. 1, U.S. Const. As to prospective sales, note Stevens v. State Mineral Board,
221 So. 2d 645 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), reversed on procedural grounds 254 La. 452,
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In order to promote security of land titles, the Louisiana Legislature
passed Act No. 62 of 1912, now La. R.S. 9:5661, a repose statute that
made state patents unassailable upon lapse of six years from the passage
of the Act. The litigation spawned by this statute is indicative of the
uncertainty which has historically attended the recognition of public
policy limitations affecting private ownership of the beds of navigable
and non-navigable waters in Louisiana. See, for example, Comment,
Ownership of Beds of Navigable Waters, 30 Tul. L. Rev. 115 (1955).
Jurisprudence prior to 1912 indicated clearly that common and public
things, dedicated to public use and benefit, could not be privately owned.
See, for example, Milne v. Girodeau,A 12 La. 324 (1838) and Zeller v.
Southern Yacht Club, 34 La. Ann. 837 (1882) relative to lands below
the high water mark and within the bed of Lake Pontchartrain, an arm
of the sea; Burns v. Crescent Gun & Rod Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So.
249 (1906), Louisiana Navigation Company v. Oyster Commission of
Louisiana, 125 La. 740, 51 So. 706 (1910) and other authorities previously
cited relative to the beds of navigable streams and the limits of waterbottoms comprising the sea and its shores.
In State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604, 58 So. 405
(1912), the Louisiana Supreme Court considered a claim of private
ownership to the lands beneath the waters of intercommunicating sounds,
bayous, creeks, channels, lakes, bays, coves and inlets bordering upon
the Gulf of Mexico and within the ebb and flow of the tide. An 1898
conveyance from the Board of Commissioners of the Lake Borgne Basin
Levee District was alleged to include such lands, together with other
swamp and overflowed lands granted by the State to the Levee District.
Recognizing that the State had acquired ownership of these tide water
bottoms (which contained a depth of water ranging from 2-1/2 to 12
feet) by right of sovereignty upon its admission to the Union, the Court
commented:
"The jurisprudence of the country is now settled to the effect
that, upon the acquisition of territory by the United States,
whether by cession from one of the states, by treaty with a
foreign country, or by discovery and settlement, the title to,
and control of, all the tide lands became vested in the govern-

223 So. 2d 542 (1970), and Winkler v. State, 239 So. 2d 484 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970),
in which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal considered the effect of Act 198 and Act
258 of 1910 on conveyances by the State of navigable waterbottoms covered by the Acts
subsequent to their passage, and determined such transfers to be nullities. Winkler held
that patents issued to a private owner pursuant to a 1910 Sheriff's Sale by the Grand
Prairie Levee District in contravention of the prohibitions of Acts 189 and 258 of 1910
were absolute nullities which vested no title to the property and which were not rendered
valid by the provisions of Act 62 of 1912.
24. "Girodeaux" in original.
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ment, 'for the benefit of the whole people, and in trust for the
several states, to be ultimately created out of the territory'; that,
though the United States, whilst holding territory, as such, may
grant, for appropriate purposes, titles or rights in the soil below
high-water mark, they have never done so, by any general laws,
but, 'unless in some case of international duty or public exigency,
have acted upon the policy, as most in accordance with the
interest of the people and with the object for which the territories
were acquired, of leaving the administration and disposition of
the sovereign rights in navigable waters and in the soil under
them to the control of the states, respectively, when organized
and admitted into the Union'; that the states admitted into the
Union since the adoption of the Constitution became at once
entitled to the soil under their navigable waters, the same as
the original states, and that nothing therein remained to the
United States save the public lands, which do not include lands
below high-water mark; that the general legislation of Congress
in respect to public lands does not extend to tide lands, but is
confined in its application to lands which are subject to sale or
other disposal, under general laws; that 'the soil beneath the
great lakes and navigable waters, above as well as below the
flow of the tide, properly belongs to the states, by their inherent
sovereignty, and the United States has wisely abstained from
extending (if it could extend) its surveys and grants beyond the
limits of high water'; that the titles and rights of riparian or
littoral proprietors in the soil below high-water mark are governed by the laws of the several states, subject to the rights
granted to the United States by the Constitution." [citations
omitted] 130 La. 604, 58 So. 405, at 407.
Citing the codal and legislative provisions in place prior to the conveyance from the Levee District, including Act 106 of 1886, and noting
that the levee board at the time of the conveyance had no authority to
alienate the waterbottoms at issue and that the plats and acreage estimates
utilized for the sale delineated the waterbottoms and merely estimated
acreage within the areas conveyed, the Court determined that the conveyance embraced only public lands which the State held for sale and
did not purport to be a conveyance of navigable and tide waters and
waterbottoms, which the State was holding in trust for all of her citizens.
The Court continued:
"It may be, and probably is, true that there is no legal impediment in the way of the state's alienating such property in
favor of particular individuals or corporations, save in so far
as such alienations might conflict with the power vested in
Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce; but, as
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we have already seen, her declared policy has always been not
to do so, and any statute or contract from which such effect
were claimed would, necessarily, be strictly construed against the
grantee." 130 La. 604, 58 So. 405, at 410.
The public policy limitation of Louisiana law which precluded private
ownership of the beds of navigable waters was later consecrated in the
state constitution which, as amended in 1921, prohibited alienation of
the fee of the bed of any navigable body of water except for purposes
of reclamation. See Section 2, Article IV of the 1921 Constitution.
The extent 2 of the public trust limitations affecting private ownership
of the beds of navigable waters under Louisiana law was tested in State
v. Erwin, 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931), in which Louisiana Supreme
Court determined that the State of Louisiana acquired by virtue of its
sovereignty ownership of the bed of Calcasieu Lake, a fresh-water inland
navigable lake, up to the high water mark of 1812, but did not acquire
title to navigable bottoms later formed by the action of the waters in
washing away and submerging privately owned lands abutting the lake.
Erwin was subsequently overruled in Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La.
784, 173 So. 315 (1936), which affirmed the State's title to lands which
had become part of the bed of a navigable lake through erosion and
in which the Court declared:
"It is the rule of property and of title in this State, and also
a rule of public policy that the State, as a sovereignty, holds
title to the beds of navigable bodies of water." 186 La. 784,
173 So. 315, at 322.
Shortly thereafter, Act No. 55 of 1938, now La. R.S. 49:1-3, was
enacted to declare the sovereignty of Louisiana along its sea coast and
to fix its present sea coast boundary and ownership. The preamble to
Act 55 began:

"Whereas dominion, with its consequent use, ownership and
jurisdiction, over its marginal waters by a State has found
support because it is the duty of a State to protect its citizens
whose livelihood depends on fishing, or taking from said mar-

ginal waters the natural products they are capable of yielding;
also, has found support in that sufficient security must exist
for the lives and property of the citizens of the State; . .."
The Act declared Louisiana's full sovereignty over and full and complete
ownership of the waters of the Gulf of Mexico and of the arms of the
Gulf and the beds and shores of the Gulf and its arms, including all
lands that are covered by the waters of the Gulf and its arms either

25.

"extend"

in original.
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at low tide or high tide, within Louisiana boundaries as established
therein. Thus by legislative fiat, the bed and shores of the sea, classified
by the Civil Code as a common thing belonging to no one, were made
public things belonging to the State of Louisiana.
At this point, the public policy limitations of Louisiana law affecting
private ownership of waterbottoms appeared to be consonant with the
limitations of the constitution and codal scheme affecting the beds of
navigable waters, the sea, arms of the sea, and their shores. Two later
court decisions, however, relying upon Act 62 of 1912, cast doubt upon
the concept of an inalienable public trust limitation affecting State
ownership of the beds of navigable waters. In Humble Oil and Refining
Co. v. State Mineral Board, 223 La. 47, 64 So. 2d 839 (1953), and
California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1 (1954), the Louisiana
Supreme Court recognized that beds of navigable bodies of water are
susceptible of private ownership where, under Act 62 of 1912, the State
failed to annul within the prescribed delay a patent which conveyed a
tract of land containing navigable waters. See also State v. Cenac, 132
So. 2d 897 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961). Justice Hawthorne argued in a
vigorous dissent in Pricethat, by enacting Act 62 of 1912, the Legislature
intended to ratify only those patents which conveyed lands susceptible
of private ownership and not patents which conveyed the beds of navigable bodies of water. Chief Justice Fournet, in his Price dissent, noted
that the majority ruling did violence to the fundamental principles of
Miami that title to the bottoms of navigable beds of water, and particularly those that form a part or an arm of the sea, are insusceptible
of private ownership, and was contrary to a "public policy that is
established by codal articles that have been interpreted and reaffirmed
in an unbroken line of jurisprudence for more than a century." See 74
So. 2d 1, at 15.
Act 727 of 1954, now La. R.S. 9:1107-1109, was a direct legislative
effort to overrule the Humble and Price cases. The Act declares that
it has been the public policy of the State of Louisiana at all times since
its admission into the Union that all navigable waters and the beds of
same within its boundaries are common or public things and insusceptible
of private ownership and that no act of the legislature has been enacted
in contravention of that policy. The Act also states that the purpose
of Act 62 of 1912 was to ratify and confirm only those patents which
conveyed or purported to convey public lands susceptible of private
ownership, the alienation or transfer of which was authorized by law.
The Act declares null and void any patent or transfer which purports
to include navigable waters and the beds thereof. Notably, the final
section of the Act stipulates that no statute enacted by the legislature
shall be construed to validate by prescription or peremption any patent
or transfer issued by the State or any levee district thereof so far as it
purports to include navigable or tide waters or the beds of same. The
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significance of the particular reference to "tide waters" in the final
section is unclear, as it would then be broader than the title to the Act
which purports to deal only with navigable waters and the beds thereof;
although consistent with the prior legislative and jurisprudential history
which assimilated state law protection of the tide waters of the sea with
state law interests in the protection of navigable waters and the reference
to the beds of navigable waters as common or public things in §1107,
the term would logically comprehend the bed and shores of the sea and
its arms.
In partial reliance upon the legislative intent manifested by the
provisions of Act 727 of 1954, the Louisiana Supreme Court overruled
Price in Gulf Oil Corporationv. State Mineral Board, 317 So. 2d 576
(La. 1974) and recognized that State patents are ineffective insofar as
they purport to convey navigable waterbottoms. In commenting upon
Act 727 of 1954, the Court indicated:
"The people of this state have been on notice since that time
[the passage of Act 727] that the rule of property in this state
is not the one announced in Price or in the Humble case; rather,
it is that rule pronounced, and never varied from, by the legislature forbidding private acquisitions of navigable water bottoms." 317 So. 2d 576, at 591.
Significantly, the many constitutions of Louisiana adopted from the
time of statehood did not speak to the matter of a limitation upon the
alienation of state lands by the Legislature until 1921.26 As previously
indicated, Article IV, Section 2 of the 1921 Constitution prohibited the
Legislature from alienating, or authorizing the alienation of, the fee of
the bed of any navigable stream, lake or other body of water, except
for purposes of reclamation. This prohibition was continued in Article
IX, Section 3 of the 1974 Constitution, which expanded on the exception
to recognize that the State may transfer the bed of a navigable water
7
body to a riparian landowner reclaiming land lost through erosion.
See, generally, Hargrave, "Statutory" and "Hortatory" Provisions of
the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 43 La. L. Rev. 647 at 660-662
(1983). The narrow focus of these constitutional provisions, particularly
in light of the prior history of law and jurisprudence in Louisiana at

26. Louisiana had eight constitutions prior to 1921: 1812, 1845, 1852, 1864, 1868,
1879, 1898 and 1913. Commencing with the Constitution of 1879, the Legislature was
prohibited from donating property of the State to any private or public person, association
or corporation. See Art. 56 of La. Const. 1879; Art. 58 of La. Consts. 1898 and 1913;
Section 12, Art. IV of La. Const. 1921; Section 14 of Art. 7 of La. Const. 1974.
27. Constitutional provisions must be strictly construed and cannot be modified or
amended by implication. King v. Bd. of Comm. for Atchafalaya Basin Levee District,
148 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied.
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the time of their adoption and the legislative policy statements which
followed (as evidenced in R.S. 9:1107-1109 and R.S. 41:1701), is a
compelling indication that Louisiana does not extend inalienable public
domain status to all tidelands which it acquired by right of sovereignty
in accordance with the majority decision in Phillips, but recognizes a
much narrower public trust limitation on private ownership of waterbottoms which focuses upon navigability (like the public trust limits
recognized by the dissenting justices in Phillips) and is grounded upon
the historical treatment of navigable waters, the sea and its shores under
our Civil Code. In this regard, by contrast to the beds of navigable
waters, including the sea and its shores, Louisiana courts have consistently recognized ownership rights of riparian owners in the beds of
non-navigable bayous and streams. See Doiron v. O'Bryan, 218 La.
1069, 51 So. 2d 628 (1951); Begnaud v. Grubb & Hawkins, 209 La.
826, 25 So. 2d 606 (1946); Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Kendall, 161 La.
337, 108 So. 664 (1926); Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637
(1922); Amite Gravel & Sand Co. v.Roseland Gravel Co., 148 La. 704,
87 So. 718 (1921); Palmer Co. v. Wilkinson, 141 La. 874, 75 So. 806
(1917); Burns v. Crescent Gun & Rod Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So. 249
(1906). See also Morgan v. Nagodish, 40 La. Ann. 246, 3 So. 636
(1888), State v. Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co., 164 La. 240, 113 So. 833
(1927), O'Brien v.State Mineral Board, 209 La. 266, 24 So. 2d 470
(1946) and R.D. Fornea Co., Inc. v.Fornea, 324 So. 2d 619 (La.App.
1st Cir. 1976), writ refused 326 So. 2d 374 (La. 1976), relative to nonnavigable lakes and sea marsh beyond the limits of "seashore". See
also A. Yiannopoulos, 2 La. Civ. Law Treatise, Property (3rd ed.) §§63,
78 (1991).
Two important measures were adopted in the 1978 Legislative Session. Act 645 of 1978, now La. R.S. 41:1701, et seq., established
Louisiana's position on public trust lands. Section 1701 provided:
"§1701. Declaration of Policy; Public Trust.
The beds and bottoms of all navigable waters and the banks
or shores of bays, arms of the sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and
navigable lakes, belong to the State of Louisiana and the policy
of this state is hereby declared to be that these lands and
waterbottoms, hereinafter referred to as 'public lands,' shall be
protected, administered and conserved to best insure full public
navigation, fishery, recreation, and other interests. Unregulated
encroachments upon these properties may result in injury and
interference with the public use and enjoyment and make create
hazards to the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of this
state. To provide for these orderly protection and management
of the stateowned properties and serve the best interests of all
citizens, the lands and waterbottoms, except those excluded and
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exempted herein below, or as otherwise provided by law shall
be under the management of the Department of Natural Resources, hereinafter referred to as 'the department' which shall
be responsible for the control, permitting, and leasing of encroachments upon public lands, in accordance with this Chapter
and the laws of Louisiana and the United States."
Pursuant to the authority of Article IX, Section 3 of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, Section 1702 of the statute recognized an exception
to the prohibition against alienation of lands protected by the public
trust which permits owners of land contiguous to or abutting navigable
waterbottoms to reclaim lands lost through erosion by the action of the
navigable waterbody occurring on and after July 1, 1921.
Significantly, in defining lands affected by the public trust, Section
1701 makes no mention of non-navigable waterbodies, even if affected
by the ebb and flow of the Gulf tide. An equally important measure
was the legislative revision of Title I of Book II of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870, accomplished by Act No. 728 of 1978. The revision
classified the waters and bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, the
territorial sea and the seashore as public things that belong to the state.
C.C. Art. 450. According to the official comments, "natural navigable
water bodies" refers to inland waters the bottoms of which belong to
the State either by virtue of its inherent sovereignty or by virtue of
other modes of acquisition, including expropriation. Consistent with prior
jurisprudence, the beds of non-navigable rivers or streams are specifically
recognized to be private things. See C.C. Art. 506, and the comments
thereunder. Again, no express limitation was recognized with respect to
non-navigable waters affected by the ebb and flow of the Gulf tide.
Accordingly, any limitation upon private ownership of such waterbottoms
must be found within the context of the codal classification for the
territorial sea and seashore.
In this regard, the Code's historic Roman law origins for "common"
rights in and along the relatively tideless Mediterranean Sea provided
little guidance for application of the codal provisions governing the sea
and its shores to the peculiar conditions of the Louisiana coast, with
its innumerable bayous, bays and inlets abutting and interspersed
throughout its coastal marsh. Louisiana jurisprudence has accordingly
fashioned the codal provisions to the particular characteristics of the
State.
As explained by Professor Yiannopoulos:
"The courts of Louisiana have regarded as 'sea' bodies of water
known as 'arms of the sea'. What is an arm of the sea has
been decided in a number of cases. In general, a body of water
will be regarded as an arm of the sea if it is located in the
immediate vicinity of the open coast and is overflowed by the
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tides directly. Thus, in the leading case of Morgan v. Negodich,
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a bayou which joined
a bay on the open coast with a bay further inland was not an
arm of the sea. Although its waters were a mixture of salt water
from the Gulf and fresh water from the Mississippi, the bayou
was not located in the immediate vicinity of the coast and was
not overflowed by the tides directly; salt water first entered an
arm of the Gulf and thence flowed into the bayou. The same
test was applied in the case of Buras v. Salinovich. It was held
in that case that a body of water subject to tidal overflow is
not merely for this reason an arm of the sea; the term applies
only to tidal waters in lakes, bays, and sounds along the open
coast. Special rules, however, apply to Lake Ponchartrain. Though
not in the vicinity of the open coast, and not affected by the
tides, Lake Ponchartrain has been consistently regarded as an
arm of the sea." See 21 La. Law Rev. 697, at 703.
Seashore is defined in the 1978 revision as the space of land over which
the waters of the sea spread in the highest tide during the winter season.
C.C. Art. 451. Official comment (b) recognizes that according to Louisiana decisions, seashore is the space of land in the open coast that is
directly overflown by the tides, citing Buras v. Salinovich, 154 La. 495,
97 So. 748 (1923), Morgan v. Negodich,28 40 La. Ann. 246, 3 So. 636
(1888), and Burns v. Crescent Gun & Rod Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So.
249 (1906). Thus, not all lands subject to tidal overflow are seashore.
As specifically recognized by the Court in Salinovich, with reference to
a tract containing over 5,000 acres of marsh land fronting on the east
bank of the Mississippi River about 85 miles below New Orleans and
claimed to be subject to regular overflow by the gulf tides as to all
but the ridges of land along the river and banks of the several bayous
within the land:
"The fact that it is subject to tidal overflow does not characterize
the land as 'seashore,' under the provisions of the Code. The
statute providing for disposing of such lands, either by the state
or by the federal government, describe them as being subject
to tidal overflow. It has never heretofore been supposed that
the definition in Article 451 of the Civil Code was intended to
include ... any and all land that is subject to tidal overflow,
however remote from the 'seashore', as it is generally understood. The waters of the Gulf of Mexico, or the bays or coves
behind plaintiff's land, do not 'spread' upon it, during the
ordinary high tides, or in the highwater seasons. The tide waters

28.

"Nagodish" in original.
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back up into the coves behind the land, and cause the bayous
in the land to rise and spread over most of the area. These
expressions in the Code 'the sea and its shores' and 'seashore,'
have reference to the gulf coast, and to the lakes, bays and
sounds along the coast. The nearest body of water that could
reasonably be characterized as a part of the sea, or as having
a seashore, in this case, is a small bay nearly a mile away from
plaintiff's land." Salinovich, 154 La. 495, 97 So. 748, at 750.
In Burns, the Court recognized and protected the private ownership of
the defendant in the beds of several non-navigable streams adjacent to
Lake Pontchartrain, an arm of the sea, and affected by the ebb and
flow of the tide from the lake, including Bayou Castiglione, whose
waters directly communicated with the waters of the lake. The Court
further rejected the claim that the latter bayou formed part of the shore
of the lake, noting that the shore comprises only that space of land
along the borders of the sea covered and bared by the tide.
See, generally, Comment, Seashore in Louisiana, 8 Tul. L. Rev.
272 (1934); A. Yiannopoulos, 2 La. Civil Law Treatise, Property (3rd
ed.) §§69-73 (1991); see also Davis Oil Co. v. Citrus Land Co., 563
So. 2d 401 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990), affirmed in part, reversed in part
and remanded, 576 So. 2d 495 (La. 1991).
Finally, in 1985 the Louisiana legislature passed Act 876 which dealt
principally with the powers and duties of the Wildlife & Fisheries Commission and included provisions relating to ownership and title to wildlife
and waterbottoms. Section 2 of the Act, now La. R.S. 41:14, provided:
"No grant, sale or conveyance of the lands forming the bottoms of rivers, streams, bayous, lagoons, lakes, bays, sounds,
and inlets bordering on or connecting with the Gulf of Mexico
within the territory or jurisdiction of the state shall be made
by the secretary of the Department of Natural Resources or by
any other official or by any subordinate political subdivision,
except pursuant to R.S. 41:1701 through 1714. Any rights accorded by law to the owners or occupants of lands on the shores
of any waters described herein shall not extend beyond the
ordinary low water mark. No one shall own in fee simple any
bottoms of lands covering the bottoms of waters described in
this Section."
Section 3 of the Act, which appears at La. R.S. 56:3, provided:
"A. The ownership and title to all wild birds, and wild quadrupeds, fish, other aquatic life, the beds and bottoms of rivers,
streams, bayous, lagoons, lakes, bays, sounds, and inlets bordering on or connecting with the Gulf of Mexico within the
territory or jurisdiction of the state, including all oysters and
other shellfish and parts thereof grown thereon, either naturally
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or cultivated, and all oysters in the shells after they are caught
or taken therefrom, are and remain the property of the state,
and shall be under the exclusive control of the Wildlife and
Fisheries Commission except as provided in R.S. 56:4.
B. Wild birds, quadrupeds, fish, other aquatic life, and the beds
and bottoms of rivers, streams, bayous, lagoons, lakes, bays,
sounds, and inlets bordering on or connecting with the Gulf of
Mexico, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, including
all oysters and other shellfish and parts thereof grown thereon,
either naturally or cultivated, and all oysters in the shells after
they are caught or taken therefrom, shall not be taken, sold,
or had in possession except as otherwise permitted in this Title;
and the title of the state to all such wild birds, quadrupeds,
fish, and other aquatic life, even though taken in accordance
with the provisions of this Title, and the beds and bottoms of
rivers, streams, bayous, lagoons, lakes, bays, sounds, and inlets
always remains in the state for the purpose of regulating and
controlling the use and disposition thereof."
The foregoing provisions borrow from language which originally appeared in the earlier oyster statutes which, as previously indicated,
recognized no original public trust limitation precluding private ownership
of the affected waterbottoms but merely proscribed alienation of affected
waterbottoms for the future. It is arguable, therefore, that Act No. 876
of 1985 does nothing more than recognize state ownership in lands which
were affected by the statutory limitations created under the previous
oyster statutes. To the extent that it may be argued that these acts
created prospectively a public trust interest in affected waterbottoms,
the limits of the trust would be measured by the terms and limitations
peculiar to each enactment during the period of its operation and in
any event would not extend beyond the specific bodies of water within
the geographical limitations imposed by the relevant statute to the extent
such waterbottoms, consistent with the purposes of the statute, were
suitable for oyster cultivation.
III.
The Codal classification of "public things subject to public use"
provides the functional equivalent in our civil law to the common law
public trust doctrine. See Yiannopoulos, Five Babes Lost in the TideA Saga of Land Titles in Two States: Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 1357 (1988). At the time of its admission to
the Union, Louisiana regarded the beds and bottoms of the territorial
sea, seashore and navigable waters as insusceptible of private ownership,
limitations which remain imbedded in our modern codal law. Indeed,
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the history of Louisiana law and jurisprudence in this area reveals that
navigability has been the hallmark of public trust limitations affecting
Louisiana waterbottoms, including tide water bottoms embraced within
the limits of the territorial sea, arms of the sea and their shores, in
much the same fashion as the dissenting justices in Phillips viewed the
common law public trust doctrine. See Burns v. Crescent Gun & Rod
Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So. 249 (1906); Louisiana Navigation Co. v.
Oyster Commission of Louisiana, 125 La. 740, 51 So. 706 (1910); State
v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604, 58 So. 405 (1912); State
v. Richardson, 140 La. 329, 72 So. 984 (1916), citing McGilvra v. Ross,
215 U.S. 70, 30 S. Ct. 27, 54 L. Ed. 95 (1909); State v. Capdeville,
146 La. 94, 83 So. 421 (1919); Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173
So. 315 (1936); Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 317 So. 2d 576
(La. 1974); Article IV, Section 2 of the 1921 Constitution; La. R.S.
9:1107; Article 9, Section 3 of the 1974 Constitution; R.S. 41:1701;
Madden, supra, at p. 5, 314-335. By contrast, the bottoms of inland
non-navigable waterbodies (i.e., non-navigable waterbottoms other than
sea or seashore), even if influenced by the tide, have been recognized
to be private things susceptible of private ownership under state law.
See A. Yiannopoulos, 2 La. Civil Law Treatise, Property (3rd ed.) §61
(1991).
In terms of public use or utility, there is no sound distinction to
be drawn between "sea marsh or prairie, subject to tidal overflow,"
which were authorized for sale by the State by Act No. 75 of 1880,
and the bottoms of inland non-navigable waters which are subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide, except perhaps to the extent such bottoms
could be deemed suitable for oyster cultivation. It cannot be said,
however, that the Oyster Statutes purported to recognize an original
inalienable public trust title in the waterbottoms affected thereby subject
to the right of all persons to use in common, as the original legislation
expressly excluded non-navigable waterbottoms and sea marsh bordering
on the Gulf which had been previously conveyed into private ownership. 29
See Chauvin v. Louisiana Oyster Commission, 121 La. 10 at 19, 46 So.
38 (1908); Louisiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Commission of Louisiana,
125 La. 740, 51 So. 706 (1910).
Moreover, as particularly evidenced by Louisiana's long-standing
recognition of private ownership of the banks of navigable streams and
as revealed by Act 247 of 1855 and Act No. 124 of 1862, the acquisition
of title by right of sovereignty does not of itself preclude divestiture of

29. Under the Codal limitations in place at the time, only navigable waters, the sea
and its shores were incapable of private ownership and therefore unaffected by the statutory
exclusion of lands previously conveyed by the State.
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such title by the State into private ownership. 0 Note in this regard,
Ellerbe v. Grace, 162 La. 846, 111 So. 185 (1927). See also C.C. Art.
504, Dickson v. Sandefur, 259 La. 473, 250 So. 2d 708 (1971) relative
to ownership of the former bed of a navigable river which has altered
its course by avulsion; Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637
(1922); Smith v. Dixie Oil Co., 156 La. 691, 101 So. 24 (1924) and
Chaney v. State Mineral Board, 444 So. 2d 105 (La. 1983) relative to
ownership of a bed of a non-navigable stream that was navigable in
1812.
IV'.
This brings us to a consideration of what changes, if any, in Louisiana law were effected by the decision in Phillips.
According to Phillips, the beds of inland non-navigable rivers or
streams that are influenced by the tide belong to the State of Louisiana
under the equal footing doctrine. The question whether the State has
kept these beds within the public trust or made them susceptible to
private ownership was recognized in Phillips to be a matter of state
law. According to Louisiana law at the time of its admission to the
Union, only the sea, the seashore and navigable water beds or bottoms
were insusceptible of private ownership. These classes of waterbottoms
remain today the only waterbottoms which by their nature are incapable
of private ownership as public things subject to public use. Non-navigable
waterbottoms, even if subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, have
been consistently recognized to be private things susceptible of private
ownership, except to the extent that special statutes, such as the Oyster
Statutes, have prohibited their alienation by the State. The reach of the
Oyster Statutes, however, extended only to bodies of water situated
along the coast which were suitable for oyster cultivation, and these
statutes have been typically cited in jurisprudence and commentaries as
evidencing the long-standing public policy of the State against alienation
of the beds of navigable waters (including the sea and its shores), beyond
which the waterbottoms affected by these statutes have not been included
within the public policy protections evidenced by Louisiana's organic
law or legislative policy statements at R.S. 9:1107 or R.S. 41:1701. See,
for example, Madden, supra, at p. 332; Gulf Oil Corporationv. State
Mineral Board, 317 So. 2d 576 at 583 (La. 1974); note also the comment

30. In fact, the Legislature specifically granted tidal overflow lands acquired by right
of inherent sovereignty to the Buras Levee Board for sale to facilitate the construction
and maintenance of levees and drains. See Acts 18 of 1894 and 205 of 1910; State v.
N.A. Baker & Son, 146 La. 413, 83 So. 693 (1920); Board of Commissioners v. Mt.
Forest Fur Farms, 178 La. 696, 152 So. 497 (1933).
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of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Winkler v. State, 239 So. 2d
484 at 486, relative to Act 189 of 1910.
Accordingly, the true impact of Phillips in Louisiana will be the
extent to which "sea" and "seashore" as recognized under our Civil
Code is determined to be equivalent to the public trust status of tidelands
under the equal footing doctrine. Such an extension, however, would
require the overruling of prior jurisprudence and impose a new expansive
interpretation of "sea" and "seashore" not heretofore countenanced by
Louisiana law.
In this regard, it is clear that Louisiana law from the period preceding
statehood did not extend the limits of its public policy protection of
lands affected by the waters of the sea to the full limits of the public
trust tidelands which the Phillips majority declared were received by
Louisiana at the time of statehood.
Louisiana's historic classification of the sea and its shores as common
things insusceptible of ownership, its codal definition of seashore as
"the space of land over which the waters of the sea spread in the
highest tide of the winter season," and its recognition of rights respecting
public use of seashores are derived almost verbatim from the Institutes
of Justinian. In Roman law, the beds of navigable rivers, like the soil
beneath the sea, were res publicae which, affected by right of public
use, were insusceptible of ownership. The limits of the sea were established with reference to the almost tideless Mediterranean, whose high
waters occurred in the winter season (in marked contrast to the situation
along the Louisiana Gulf coast). The consecration of the Roman law
in the Digest of 1808 and subsequent codal revisions with respect to
rights in lands affected by the waters of the sea is clearly reflected by
the failure of the redactors to adopt either the definition of seashore
in Las Siete Partidas as "that space of ground covered by the waters
of the sea, in their highest annual swells, whether in winter or summer,"
or French law principles regarding seashore as the land normally covered
by the highest tides of the year. While, according to one commentator,
Spanish law has expanded the Partidas definition to include the space
of land affected by the tides, or by the largest waves during storms,
in such places where the ebb and flow of the sea is not felt, Louisiana
law has held fast to its Roman law origins in recognizing the limits of
the seashore under its codal definition. Louisiana jurisprudence has
consistently interpreted seashore as limited to lands in the open coast
which are directly overflown by the tides of the sea, the only exception
found in the classification of Lake Pontchartrain as an arm of the sea.3'

31. It has been suggested that the treatment of Lake Pontchartrain as an exception
to the "open coast" rule has been influenced by its geological origins as part of the Gulf
of Mexico created when a delta finger of the Mississippi River united with the mainland,
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See Morgan, Burns, Salinovich, Sweet Lake, Erwin, and Davis Oil
Company, supra; Comment, Seashore in Louisiana, 8 Tul. L. Rev. 272
(1934); Comment, Alluvion and Dereliction in Lakes, 7 Tul. L. Rev.
438 at 441-442 (1932-1933). Expansion of the limits of "seashore" has
been resisted by the courts as necessitating a rewriting of the Civil Code
provision, a province which belongs to the legislature. See A. K. Roy,
Inc. v. Board of Commissioners for the PontchartrainLevee District,
238 La. 926, 117 So. 2d 60 (1960).
It has been correctly suggested nonetheless that judicial decisions
construing the scope of "sea" and "seashore" are not law but mere
interpretations of the law without binding effect as precedents. See A.
Yiannopoulos, Five Babes Lost in the Tide-A Saga of Land Titles in
Two States: Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 62 Tul. Law Rev.
1357 (1988). In this regard, Louisiana recognizes but two sources of
law: legislation and custom, the paramount source of law being legislation. See La. C.C. Arts. 1-4. It has also been said:
"The civilian does not regard the judicial interpretations of a
statute as becoming part of the statute, so that the statute as
interpretedis the law. He regards the statute alone as being the
law, and prior decisions do not 'insulate' him . .. from going
directly to the statute for its meaning. In ideal theory, the civilian
judge decides cases primarily 'not by reference to other decisions,
but by reference to legislative texts and within the limits of such
judicial discretion as the legislative texts grant."' Tate, Techniques of Judicial Interpretation in Louisiana, 22 La. L. Rev.
727 at 744 (1962).
These principles were relied upon by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in its Gulf Oil decision in rejecting the notion of hardship upon those
property owners within the State who had theretofore relied upon the
pronouncements of its Price decision, the Court commenting that "when
it is necessary to overrule a short line of clearly erroneous jurisprudence
in order to reinstate the long-standing law and public policy of this
State, that course is clearly the one that must be followed." See 317
So. 2d 576 at 591. In its Miami Corp. decision, the Court also stated:
"....
In Louisiana, this court has never hesitated to overrule a
line of decisions where they establish a rule of property when
greater harm would result from perpetuating the error rather
than from correcting." See 173 So. at 320.
It is submitted, however, that the legislative and jurisprudential history
in this State does not reflect a public policy position recognizing public

enclosing a portion of the Gulf in what is today Lake Pontchartrain. See Comment,
Seashore in Louisiana, 8 Tul. L. Rev. 272 (1934).
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trust limitations upon, or precluding private ownership rights in, waterbottoms affected by the ebb and flow of the tide acquired by Louisiana
by right of sovereignty under the Phillips decision beyond those policy
limitations clearly expressed in our code, constitution and jurisprudence
respecting navigable waters (including the sea and its shores). Modification of that body of law and jurisprudence to divest private ownership
in recognition of a public trust limitation upon alienation of all Phillips
tidewater bottoms within Louisiana would indeed be contrary to other
policies of this State which favor not only stability in the law and
constancy of jurisprudence, but which also favors stability in real estate
titles. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 317 So. 2d 576 (La.
1974), and O'Brien v. State Mineral Board, 209 La. 266, 24 So. 2d 470
(1946). From a historical and practical perspective, note also the observations of Chief Justice O'Niell in his dissenting opinion in the Miami
Corp. decision (186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 at 341-343), including the
following citation from 15 C.J. § 342:
"Stability is especially requisite in the law in regard to titles to
real property. Titles may be dependent largely or wholly upon.
previous decisions, and landed interests would be jeopardized
by sudden or frequent changes in the interpretation or construction of legal principles. By reason of this the courts are always
reluctant to overrule or reverse a decision when title to real
property will be involved. Therefore, when a court of last resort
has announced principles affecting the acquisition of title to real
property, and the principles thus announced have become established and have been frequently recognized and conformed
to, and property rights have been acquired thereunder, it has
generally been held that the decisions should not be overturned
save by the interposition of the legislative power, even though
the principles announced therein might otherwise be questioned."
186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 at 342.
In this sense, it may be fairly stated that in Louisiana, unlike Mississippi, the codal, legislative, jurisprudential and constitutional history
of the law in this area reveals fundamental assumptions about the public
trust which underlie existing property titles, a modification of which
would upset reasonable and settled expectations of property owners
within the State. This proposition is evident in the few judicial decisions
extant in Louisiana in which the Phillips doctrine has been considered.
In Delacroix Corporation v. Jones-O'Brien, Incorporated and Martin
Exploration Co., No. 21-193 "B" of the 25th Judicial District Court,
Parish of Plaquemines, the District Court commented:
"Since the court concludes that Lake Quatro Caballo was not
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide in 1812 it is not necessary
to discuss Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469,
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108 Sup. Ct. 791, 98 L. Ed. 877 (1988). That decision held that
[in the] State of Mississippi ownership of sovereignty waterbottoms acquired on admission to the Union extended to the limits
of the effect of the tide, through marsh and into the barest
depths of waters. The Court comments that the Phillips Petroleum Co. decision is the ultimate justification for the wisdom
of the 1912 Legislature in their adoption of Act 62 of that
session. But for that legislation every private domain owner of
an opening in the marsh, large owners and small, would need
to stand ready to litigate on the level of the instant case, and
produce like expert testimony on a complicated historical subject,
or forfeit their ownership to state claims which had been allowed
to lie dormant for nearly a century."
In Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Company, Inc., No. 85-1015 of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, decided
May 16, 1991, the findings of the Court distinguished "tidal" lands
acquired by Louisiana by right of inherent sovereignty in 1812 (i.e.,
lands underlain by waters influenced by the Gulf tides) from "seashore"
(i.e., lands in the open coast directly overflown by the tides). The
disputed property consisted largely of non-navigable, low trembling prairie interspersed with shallow, non-navigable bays and bayous at and
prior to 1902, when the State issued land patents covering the area at
issue. The Court made separate findings that the lands were not subject
to influence by the Gulf tides, were not seashore and did not include
the bottoms of naturally navigable waterbodies. Significantly, the Court
rejected Louisiana's "tidal" and "navigational" title claims upon concluding that since none of the contested property constituted the bottoms
of natural navigable water bodies or seashore at or prior to the issuance
of the various land patents by the State, "the State did not run afoul
of any alienation restriction for public things." No separate and independent state law "public trust" limitation was recognized to apply
to "tidal" lands originally acquired by Louisiana under the federal public
trust doctrine as announced in Phillips.
Apart from these considerations, it might also be argued that the
title acquired by the States by right of inherent sovereignty remains
irrevocably vested with a public trust and that State public trust limits
do not preempt federal public trust concepts with respect to affected
lands or waterbottoms. In this regard, the Louisiana Supreme Court
commented in Gulf Oil Corporation v. State Mineral Board, 317 So.
2d 576 (La. 1974), as follows:
"It was held in Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 13 S. Ct. 110, 118, 36 L. Ed. 1018 (1892), that the states
cannot abdicate their trust over property in which the people
as a whole are interested so as to leave it entirely under the
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use and control of private parties. In that case, the United States
Supreme Court even held that a legislative grant of the State's
title to submerged lands under Lake Michigan could be repealed
by subsequent legislation because the lands in question were held
in trust for the public use. See dissenting opinion of Hawthorne,
J., from denial of writs in State v. Cenac, 132 So. 2d at 933.
In Federal and State Lands in Louisiana, Madden says the
following about the application of the public trust concept in
Louisiana:
'It appears only realistically factual and legally sound to adopt
and state the view that the public policy of the state treating
navigable water beds as inalienable and insusceptible of private
ownership actually arose when Louisiana attained statehood, for
the public trust was then created, resulting in the vesture of a
fixed and indestructible public right, only changeable by the
consent and positive action of the people of the state in their
collective sovereignty. Under that premise, doubt has been expressed as to the legal effectiveness of legislation to surrender
the vested rights of the people themselves, the more plausible
and stronger view being that the abdication of such vested public
rights could only be lawfully accomplished by constitutional
means and procedure.' (Emphasis supplied.) Madden at 335.
This theory casts grave doubt upon whether the legislature could
have alienated the beds of navigable waters under the 1912 repose
statute or, for that matter, under any legislative pronouncement;
for this reason, we stated above that the notion of public trust
could be dispositive of this case." 317 So. 2d 576, at 589.
Despite the foregoing comment, Louisiana Supreme Court did not
acknowledge that express constitutional authority was required for the
alienation of a public trust title, recognizing instead that for pre-constitutional purposes, because the beds of navigable waters of Louisiana
are held in "public domain" for the people of the State, that at the
very least (if at all possible) any alienation or grant of the title to
navigable waters by the legislature must be expressed and specific and
is never implied or presumed from general language in a grant or statute.
See 317 So. 2d at 589. The Court did indicate, in dicta, that under the
public trust doctrine 2 as enunciated in Illinois Central Ry., supra, Act
727 of 1954 would be valid whether classified as interpretive legislation
or not, since in that case the United States Supreme Court allowed the
legislature to repeal a grant of public lands to private individuals because
it violated the public trust. Nonetheless, the suggestion of a requirement

32.
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for express constitutional authorization for the alienation of public trust
lands would run counter to earlier pronouncements of the Court which
recognized that the State legislature, unlike Congress, is invested with
the power to do whatever is not prohibited by its constitution, which,
as previously indicated, has simply prohibited since 1921 the alienation
of navigable waterbottoms. See Bozant v. Campbell, 9 Rob. 411 (1845);
State v. Gutierrez, 15 La. Ann. 190 (1860). Note also State v. Bayou
Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604 at 612-613, 58 So. 405 (1912); State
v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94 at 107, 83 So. 421 (La. 1919); Realty Operators
v. State Mineral Board, 202 La. 398, 12 So. 2d 198 at 203 (1942);
O'Brien v. State Mineral Board, 209 La. 266, 24 So. 2d 470 at 473
(1946).
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court in Phillips left little
doubt regarding the authority of each state to relinquish its public trust
claim to tide lands. According to the majority decision:
". .. it has been long-established that the individual States have
the authority to define the limits of the lands held in public
trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they see
fit. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S., at 26, 14 S. Ct. at 557. Some
of the original States, for example, did recognize more private
interest in tide lands than did others of the 13-more private
interests than were recognized at common law, or in the dictates
of our public trusts cases." (emphasis added)
And as for the effect of our decision today in other States,
we are doubtful that this ruling will do more than confirm the
prevailing understanding-which in some States is the same as
Mississippi's, and in others, is quite different. As this Court
wrote in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S., at 26, 14 S. Ct. at 557,
'there is no universal and uniform law upon the subject; but
... each State has dealt with the lands under the tide waters
within its borders according to its own views of justice and
policy.'
Consequently, our ruling today will not upset titles in all coastal
States, as petitioners intimated at argument.... As we have
discussed supra at 475, many coastal States, as a matter of state
law, granted all or a portion of their tidelands to adjacent upland
property owners long ago. Our decision today does nothing to
change ownership rights in States which previously relinquished
a public trust claim to tidelands such as those at issue here."
See 108 S. Ct. 791, at 794-795, 798-799.
In a footnote comment to the foregoing, the Court notes that even in
some of the States in which tide lands are privately held, public rights
to use the tide lands for purposes of fishing, hunting, bathing, etc.,
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have been long recognized. By implication, the Court thereby acknowledged that alienation by an individual state of public trust tide lands
into private ownership does not require for its validity the retention of
a public right of use conformable to the original public trust. In Appleby
v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 46 S. Ct. 569 (1926), the United
States Supreme Court expressly recognized that the power of a State to
part with property under navigable waters to private persons, free from
subsequent regulatory control of the water over the land and the land
itself, is a state question to be determined from the law of the state
at the time the deeds to the property were executed. Moreover, the
Court distinguished the limitations imposed by its Illinois Central Ry.
Co. decision as follows:
"It is urged, against our view of what these deeds conveyed of
the sovereign power of the State and the ownership of the city
at the time of their execution, that it is opposed to the judgment
of this Court in Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 13 S. Ct. 110, in which the validity of a grant by the
Illinois Legislature to the Illinois Central Railroad Company of
more than 1,000 acres, in the harbor of Chicago in Lake Michigan, was under consideration. It was more than three times
the area of the outer harbor, and not only included all that
harbor, but embraced the adjoining submerged lands which would
in all probability be thereafter included in the harbor. It was
held that it was not conceivable that a legislature could divest
the State of this absolutely in the interest of a private corporation, that it was a gross perversion of the trust over the
property under which it was held, an abdication of sovereign
governmental power, and that a grant of such right was invalid.
The limitations on the doctrine were stated by Mr. Justice Field,
who delivered the opinion, as follows, at page 452 (13 S. Ct.
118):
"The interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and
in commerce over them may be improved in many instances by
the erection of wharves, docks and piers therein, for which
purpose the State may grant parcels of the submerged lands;
and, so long as their disposition is made for such purpose, no
valid objections can be made to the grants. It is grants of parcels
of lands under navigable waters, that may afford foundation
for wharves, piers, docks, and other structures in aid of commerce, and grants of parcels which, being occupied, do not
substantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters
remaining, that are chiefly considered and sustained in the adjudged cases as a valid exercise of legislative power consistently
with the trust to the public upon which such lands are held by
the State. But that is a very different doctrine from the one
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which would sanction the abdication of the general control of
the State over lands under the navigable waters of an entire
harbor or bay, or of a sea or lake. Such abdication is not
consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires the
government of the State to preserve such waters for the use of
the public. The trust devolving upon the state for the public,
and which can only be discharged by the management and
control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot
be relinquished by a transfer of the property. The control of
the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except
as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the
public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial
impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining. It is only by observing the distinction between a grant
of such parcels for the improvement of the public interest, or
which when occupied do not substantially impair the public
interest in the lands and waters remaining, and a grant of the
whole property in which the public is interested, that the language
of the adjudged cases can be reconciled." Appleby, 271 U.S.
364 at 393-395, 46 S.Ct. 569 at 578.
Accordingly, the public trust doctrine does not impose any limitation
upon the power of a state to dispose of public trust property as an
incident and part of its sovereignty, whether the disposition be in full
ownership or subject to public easement, provided the disposition is
reasonable and can fairly be said to be for the public benefit and
without substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and
waters remaining. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14 S. Ct. 548 at
565, 38 L. Ed. 331 (1894); see also, Weber v. Commissioners, 18 Wall.
57 (1873), McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70, 30 S.Ct. 27, 54 L. Ed. 95
(1909) and United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 37 S.Ct. 380 (1917).
Nor has Louisiana jurisprudence historically recognized such a limitation
upon the right of the State to dispose of lands received by it by right
of inherent sovereignty independent of limitations imposed by state law.
See, for example, State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604, 58
So. 405 (1912); State v. Richardson, 140 La. 329, 72 So. 984 (1916);
Palmer Co. v. Wilkinson, 141 La. 874, 75 So. 806 (1917); State v.
Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 83 So. 421 (1919), cert. den. 246 U.S. 581, 40
S. Ct. 346, 64 L. Ed. 727 (1920); Realty Operators v. State Mineral
Board, 202 La. 398, 12 So. 2d 198 (1942); O'Brien v.State Mineral
Board, 209 La. 266, 24 So. 2d 470 (1946).
Finally, it may be suggested by some that Phillips effects no change
in Louisiana regarding ownership of non-navigable, tidal waterbottoms
by its suggestion that such bottoms are affected by the waters of the
sea by the mere consequence of tidal influence (see 106 S.Ct. at 797)
and that such sea bottoms are inalienable by the long-standing classi-
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fication of sea under the Civil Code. This position is untenable for
several reasons. First, Phillips expressly recognized that states have the
authority to define the limits of the lands held in public trust and
Louisiana state law has not recognized "sea" or "seashore" to reach
to the limits of Phillips tidewater bottoms. Secondly, such a result would
require reclassification of tidally-influenced navigable rivers as "sea"
and produce ownership results with respect to the banks of such streams
at variance with Louisiana law. Would, for example, state ownership
of the bottom of the navigable Jourdan River, if situated in Louisiana,
extend to the ordinary high water mark? Are "seashore" principles to
be applied to the banks of such streams? In this regard, it is noteworthy
that even the oyster statutes affecting v aterbodies along the Louisiana
coast recognize the limits of riparian ownership to extend to the ordinary
low water mark.
Some mention should also be made of other factors and policy
considerations which may ultimately have some significance in the resolution of the ownership issues presented by the Phillips decision. For
example, with respect to specific properties now in private ownership,
consideration should be given to the historic recognition and treatment
of "public trust tidelands" by the State and its agencies under the
Phillips criteria in the way of segregation, taxation, use and protection
of public trust interests, allocation of mineral resources etc. and to the
potential impacts arising from a present divestiture of historic private
titles (particularly, for example, with regard to existing commercial or
residential development or claims for prior mineral revenues from affected lands). Equally important is a consideration of the effects of
various acts of man, both public and private, in the construction of
levees, canals and pipelines and related oil and gas activities on the
natural processes of subsidence and erosion which have operated to
greatly expand the inland reach of the influence of the gulf tides beyond
the 1812 limits and of the impact of those artificial works on ownership
changes as inland private property becomes coastal tidelands. For a
perspective on the causes of land loss along the coast, see Houck, Land
Loss in Coastal Louisiana: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies, 58
Tul. Law Rev. 3 (1983).
V.
House Bill 539 was introduced in the 1991 Regular Session of the
Louisiana Legislature to clarify Louisiana law through codification of
Louisiana's long-standing jurisprudential construction of seashore. Its
provisions are consistent with Louisiana law.
Such legislative action is clearly within the province of the legislature.
As interpretive legislation which does not create new rules, but merely
establishes the meaning that the interpreted law had from the time of
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its enactment, the measure is similar to the policy declarations and
objectives of the Legislature under Act 727 of 1954 in response to the
Louisiana Supreme Court decision in California Co. v. Price, 225 La.
706, 74 So. 2d 1 (1954). See Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board,
317 So. 2d 576 at 590-592 (La. 1974). Moreover, as recognized in the
Miami Corp. decision, the public policy of the state is whatever the
Legislature has declared it to be, and the proposed measure would be
appropriate even if not regarded as a mere clarification of existing law.
Indeed, the Miami Corp. decision, in questioning the distinction between
Lake Calcasieu and Lake Pontchartrain under the Erwin analysis as
inland lake versus "arm of the sea," commented:
"Certainly this phrase should have some definite meaning and
its explanation should not be left to the discretion of the court
in a particular case, in order that the jurisprudence and the law
may be uniform and effective." See Miami Corp., 186 La. 784,
173 So. 315 at 326 (1936).
CONCLUSION

From the opinion set forth above, it follows that with respect to
"Phillips Lands" (i.e. lands not covered by navigable waters including
the sea and its shore but which are lands subject to being covered by
water from33 the influence of the tide), which previously have been
alienated by the state under laws existing at the time of such alienation,
the U.S. Supreme Court's Phillips decision does not reinvest the State
of Louisiana with any ownership of such lands, i.e. by the Phillips
decision, the State of Louisiana has not acquired any new ownership
of property which the state disposed of under laws applicable at the
time of disposition.
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